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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the collateral order doctrine permits the
immediate appeal of a district court order denying
appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The Petitioner in this case is Sai, an individual.
Petitioner was the plaintiff and appellant below. Sai
is Petitioner’s full legal name.
The Respondent is the Transportation Security
Administration, which was defendant and appellee
below.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Sai respectfully petitions this Court for
a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The order of the D.C. Circuit dismissing Sai’s
appeal is unreported and is reproduced at page 1a of
the appendix to this petition (“App.”). The order of the
D.C. Circuit denying Sai’s petition for initial hearing
en banc to review whether the Court had jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine is reproduced at
page 3a of the appendix, and the minute order denying
appointed to counsel by the United States District
Court of the District of Columbia is reproduced at
page 4a.
JURISDICTION
Sai timely appealed the district court’s January 7,
2016 order denying his motion to appoint counsel on
January 8, 2016. The D.C. Circuit denied Sai’s
petition for initial hearing en banc on March 11, 2016,
and dismissed the appeal on June 6, 2016 for lack of
jurisdiction. App. 1a-3a. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
TITLE
28—JUDICIARY
PROCEDURE

AND

JUDICIAL

§ 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis
***
(e)(1) The court may request an attorney to represent
any person unable to afford counsel.

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Sai filed a suit challenging repeated
violations by the Transportation Safety Administration of the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act. Complaint at 1.
In the district court, Sai moved for leave to file a
request ex parte and under seal for in forma pauperis
status and the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Sai requested to file his supporting affidavits under seal for privacy concerns. Mar. 13,
2014 Motion at 1-2. The court denied his motion the
same day. Sai later tried again, orally moving for
appointment of counsel, and incorporating by reference filings in another case resolved just prior in the
same court that day. App. 4a. The district court
denied the motion for the same reasons as in Sai’s
other case, id.,—namely that Sai must submit an
affidavit of his assets for the public record. App. 53a.
Sai appealed the denial of counsel to the D.C.
Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit issued an order to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for a lack
of jurisdiction. Order to Show Cause. In response Sai
filed a petition for initial hearing en banc, conceding
that the D.C. Circuit already had decided that orders
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) are not
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The
court denied the petition, App. 3a, and dismissed the
case, App.1a. This petition followed.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON WHETHER
ORDERS DENYING COUNSEL ARE
IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE
Over thirty years ago, Justices White and
Blackmun dissented from a denial of certiorari on
whether denial of appointment of counsel orders were
immediately appealable collateral orders, asserting
that the issue must be resolved by this Court because
of its importance and the developing division among
circuits. Welch v. Smith, 484 U.S. 903 (1987) (White,
J. dissent from denial of writ of certiorari). The
collateral order doctrine applies appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to collateral orders and allows
review of district court orders that: (1) “conclusively
determine the disputed question;” (2) “resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action;” and (3) are “effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (listing the Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)
factors).
Three decades after Justice White’s
prescient dissent, all thirteen circuits have now
weighed in and remain intractably divided. The
circuits holding the issue is immediately appealable
correctly apply the collateral order doctrine.
A. The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits Hold Orders Denying Counsel Under
§ 1915(e) Are Immediately Appealable.
The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits all have held that orders denying
appointment of counsel are immediately appealable.
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Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1306

(9th Cir. 1981).

In Hudak v. Curators of University of Missouri,
the Eighth Circuit noted that it has held that a denial
of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 19151 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) is immediately appealable because it
causes irreparable harm to the plaintiff on appeal of
the final judgment. 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1978); see
also Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587,
588 (8th Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit has declined
to extend its holding in Slaughter to habeas cases,
however, on the ground that the district court must
evaluate the merits of a plaintiff’s case to determine if
counsel is appropriate. Pena-Calleja v. Ring, 720 F.3d
988, 989 (8th Cir. 2013). In habeas cases, unlike in
denial of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the court evaluates the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success—not just potential
merit—when determining whether counsel is
appropriate, so the counsel determination is not
separable from the merits. Id.
The Federal Circuit agrees that orders denying
the appointment of counsel under § 1915 satisfy
Cohen and are immediately appealable collateral
orders. Lariscey v. United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1269
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (highlighting that decisions of counsel
were “conclusively answered” even if decided without
prejudice).

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was redesignated §1915(e) with changes

not relevant to this matter. U.S. Pub. L. 104-134 §804(a) (1996).
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In Spanos v. Penn Central Transportation
Company, the Third Circuit determined that orders
denying counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 are
immediately appealable. 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1972). The Third Circuit has emphasized the
separability of counsel orders made in civil cases. Ray
v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981)
(expanding on the Spanos holding). These orders are
separable because they are not dependent on the
merits of a plaintiff’s case. See id. at 477.
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that orders
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) are immediately appealable. See
Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308
(5th Cir. 1977); see also Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d
405, 409 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit has ruled
differently in cases not decided pursuant to the
statutes at issue in this case. In, for example,
products liability suits or cases brought pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court determination of
whether plaintiff receives counsel is tied to whether
the court believes plaintiff will be successful on the
merits. See Marler v. Adonis, 997 F.2d 1141, 1143
(5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Caston to products
liability suits because “counsel accept products
liability cases on contingent fees, even in the weakest
of cases”).
The Ninth Circuit, as has previously been noted
by this Court, has created a complicated
interpretation of whether denial of counsel orders are
immediately appealable. See Welch v. Smith, 484
U.S. 903 (1987) (White, J. dissent from denial of writ
of certiorari). Orders denying requests for counsel
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under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(f)(1)(B) are immediately
appealable in the Ninth Circuit. Bradshaw, 662 F.2d
1301. The court distinguishes requests for counsel
made in habeas proceedings, because in these cases
the court is required to look to the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim; therefore, the orders are not
separable under the collateral appeal doctrine.
Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir.
1983).
B. The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits Hold Orders
Denying Counsel Are Not Immediately
Appealable.
The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all erroneously relied on
this Court’s holding in Firestone to determine that
orders denying counsel are not immediately
appealable as collateral orders. See Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (holding
that orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases are not
immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine).
In the First Circuit, orders denying counsel under
28 U.S.C. § 1915) are not immediately appealable,
because the court reasoned that the orders are not
conclusively determined. Appleby v. Meachum, 696
F.2d 145, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The
court cited to the theory that a district court can
reassess a plaintiff’s need for counsel throughout the
litigation and that these orders are reviewable on
appeal. See id.
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The Second Circuit also holds that orders denying
counsel are not immediately appealable. See Miller v.
Pleasure, 425 F.2d 1205, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970), overruling
Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 283 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962). The court reversed
the its prior holding in Miller on the rationale that
there was a growing burden of appeals, and denial of
counsel does not in itself destroy a plaintiff’s claim.
See Miller, 425 F.2d at 1205. Instead, denial of
counsel simply denies an “added facility in the
prosecution of his claim.” Id.
Despite the law in the Second Circuit that denial
of appointment of counsel orders are not final orders,
the court evaluated a denial of request for counsel in
a Title VII case “in the interest of judicial economy.”
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate,
Inc., 865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988). The court allows
the interlocutory appeal of orders denying IFP status,
and noted that “the same factors” are relevant to
appellate review of denial of counsel orders. Id.
The Sixth Circuit holds that requests for counsel
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) and § 1983 are
inherently not final decisions. Henry v. City of Detroit
Manpower Dep’t, 763 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (citing that because of the timing of orders
denying counsel—before the complaint, the record
development, etc.—the orders “should be presumed
tentative”).
The court relied on Firestone and
Flanagan to determine orders disqualifying counsel in
criminal cases are not separate from the merits. See
id.at 762.
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The Seventh Circuit determined that orders
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for products
liability claims are not appealable because they are in
essence reviewable after final judgment. Randle v.
Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.
1981).
Quoting Firestone, the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that orders “at worst … merely result[] in
the delay caused by the need to retry the case.” See
id. at 1066-67.
The Tenth Circuit also relied on Firestone for the
conclusion that orders denying counsel under 28
U.S.C. § 1915 meet the Cohen conclusiveness and
separability prongs, but are “fully reviewable after
final judgment,” and therefore “a single controversy.”.
Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 170 (1974)).
The Eleventh Circuit determined that denials of
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 are not immediately
appealable. Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 851 (11th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (“such an order fails all three prongs
of the Cohen test”). It later held that Holt implicitly
overruled Caston, and seeing no basis for
distinguishing denial of counsel in § 1983 cases from
Title VII cases, extended this holding to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 as well. Hodges v. Department of Corrections,
State of Ga., 895 F. 2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
The D.C. Circuit was the last circuit to address
this issue, and determined that orders denying
counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)are not
immediately appealable. Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d
978, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court reasoned that
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these orders are not conclusive and that they are
reviewable on appeal (and by the district court
throughout trial). See id. at 980-81.
II. THE CIRCUITS THAT HOLD THESE ORDERS
ARE IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE ARE
CORRECT.
The circuits allowing the immediate appeal of
denial of appointment of counsel orders better apply
the collateral order doctrine, as they evaluate the
reality of what happens to an indigent plaintiff’s case
when counsel is denied.
First, orders denying counsel are conclusively
determined. Conclusively determined orders are ones
that are the district court’s “last word on the subject.”
Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1306. Final orders include
orders made without prejudice. See Spanos v. Penn
Ctrl. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972).
An order denying counsel is a complete, formal court
order that impacts all future proceedings.
Some circuits have held that because district
courts can reassess a plaintiff’s need for counsel
throughout litigation, orders denying counsel are not
conclusive. See, e.g. Appleby, 146 F.3d at 982. This
evaluation incorrectly interprets the conclusively
determined prong. When the district court determines that a plaintiff is not entitled to counsel, the
denial is a complete and formal order that governs all
further proceedings. Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1269.
Therefore such orders are effectively conclusive for
the duration of the case. Although the orders are
potentially subject to revision by the district court, for
example if a meritorious case begins to develop, in
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practice courts rarely grant plaintiffs counsel after an
initial denial. It is also practically unlikely that an
indigent plaintiff will develop a meritorious case
without the assistance of counsel, particularly when
the case involves complex legal issues.
Second, orders denying counsel are separable
from the merits of an action. An order is separable if
the district court does not have to get enmeshed in the
case’s substantive issues, but instead minimally
inquires into the merits of the action. See Henry, 763
F.2d at 767 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1036
(1985). This includes cases where the underlying
issue in the order is of “critical importance” to the
litigation. Id.
In Firestone, this Court left the question for
another day of whether an order disqualifying counsel
in a civil case is separable from the merits. Firestone,
449 U.S. at 376. Three years later, this Court
determined that orders disqualifying counsel were not
immediately appealable in a criminal case because the
orders were not separable. Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1984). To determine whether
counsel should be disqualified, the court must
determine whether the defense was impaired, which
substantively analyzes the viability of a defendant’s
claim. Id. It is clear that orders disqualifying counsel
are not independent from the merits of the case. In
evaluating an order denying appointment of counsel
on appeal, however, the appellate court would not
need to make any substantive evaluation of the
plaintiff’s case.
Conversely, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district
court’s determination of whether a plaintiff is entitled
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to counsel is wholly unrelated to the substance of
plaintiff’s claim, or to any issues that occur during
proceedings. In requests for counsel made pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the plaintiff’s indigence is the
only relevant fact. The circuits have created different
standards for what circumstances are just. For
example, in the Eighth Circuit the determination of
whether plaintiff is entitled to counsel depends on
whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie claim,
the plaintiff has tried and failed to retain counsel, and
whether the “nature of the litigation is such that
plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the
assistance of counsel.” Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph
Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984).
In general, entitlement to counsel is dependent on
whether plaintiff’s claim is potentially meritorious,
not on an actual determination of the merits. See, e.g.,
Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1319 (discussing that plaintiffs
with potentially non-meritorious claims are
sometimes unable to find counsel, as “the provision for
appointment of counsel would be wholly unnecessary
if all meritorious claims attracted retained counsel”);
see also Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (comparing denials
of IFP status, which are immediately appealable
collateral orders that do not evaluate the claim’s
merits, to denials of counsel). When the district court
does evaluate the merits, it is not a problematic
assessment of the validity of plaintiff’s claim; instead,
the district court merely assures the claim is not
“patently frivolous.” Poindexter v. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, 737 F.2d 1173, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The court need only determine that “the plaintiff
appears to have some chance of prevailing” for the
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litigant to meet the “meritorious” factor of the test. Id.
at 1187.
Finally, orders denying counsel are not effectively
reviewable upon final appeal, because there are no
other practical remedies available to a plaintiff once
counsel is denied. For immediately appealable orders,
“appellate review must occur before trial to be fully
effective.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266. Here, whether
the plaintiff can benefit from the appointment of
counsel is essential to a pro se litigant’s case. If the
plaintiff is entitled to counsel, “he needs such counsel
now” to benefit at trial; otherwise, the plaintiff will be
forced to litigate the complex legal system without
guidance. Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1270.
If appeal of denials of counsel await the outcome
of proceedings, only four outcomes are possible. The
first and most likely outcome is that the pro se
plaintiff will not be able to pursue complex claims
alone and will simply give up. The second outcome is
that the pro se plaintiff engages in the full gamut of
proceedings without the assistance of counsel, and if
the plaintiff is successful on the subsequent appeal,
the entire prior proceedings “would be declared a
nullity: not an efficient use of either personal or
judicial resources.” Id. Third, in the exceedingly rare
circumstance, the pro se plaintiff may find success.
Fourth, the pro se litigant could pursue claims to
conclusion and lose on appeal.
This Court determined in Firestone that orders
disqualifying counsel are not immediately appealable
because, in order to be unreviewable, “denial of
immediate review would render impossible any
review whatsoever.” 449 U.S. at 376 (quoting United
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States

v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
Disqualification of counsel is distinguishable from
denial of counsel, however, in part because “a decision
on appellant’s need for counsel must be made before
the trial if it is to be of any practical effect to him.”
Ray, 640 F.2d at 477. Additionally, disqualification is
distinguishable because when counsel is denied, there
are no other practical remedies available to plaintiff.
See Randle, 664 F.2d at 1068 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
Finally, the potential harm from disqualification is
not as great as outright denial of counsel, as denial
effectively limits litigants’ access to the courts. See id.
The importance of having counsel at the
beginning of litigation highlights the need for
immediate reviewability of denial of counsel orders.
Slaughter, 731 F.2d at 589 (finding that the harm
from denying appointment of counsel “can be
irreparable”); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756
(8th Cir. 1971). A pro se plaintiff does not necessarily
understand the complexity of the law or possible
errors committed at trial that must be preserved for
proper appeal. See Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1311.
Many of the circuits that determined that denial
of counsel orders are not collateral orders base their
holdings on the reviewability prong. For example, the
First Circuit has held the pro se plaintiff can “persist
long enough [in his case] to raise the issue of
appointed counsel along with any other issues he
preserves in his appeal from a final judgment.”
Appleby, 696 F.2d at 146 (1988). This determination
was over thirty years ago—as were many circuit
determinations—and litigation has only gotten more
expensive, complicated, and time consuming. A

14
correct application of the collateral order doctrine,
therefore, allows the interlocutory appeal of orders
denying the appointment of counsel.
III.

THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE.

A. After three decades of confusion, circuits
remain in conflict with each other and amongst
themselves.
Denying appointment of counsel for indigent
plaintiffs certainly hinders a plaintiff’s case, but
refusing to hear the appeal from such a denial often
hobbles a case before it ever has a chance to get out of
the gate. The issue of whether a denial of appointment of counsel order is immediately appealable as a
collateral order has confused the circuits, caused line
drawing between statutes, and caused one circuit to
switch positions in less than a decade. Circuit courts
need guidance from this Court regarding the proper
analysis of the collateral appeal doctrine in regards to
indigent plaintiffs and their denied appointment of
counsel.
As previously mentioned, circuits remain divided
as to whether plaintiffs can immediately appeal the
denial of appointed counsel, which creates vastly
different court determinations based on which federal
court the plaintiff brings suit. Five circuits hold that
such denials are immediately appealable, and eight
circuits hold that the denials do not satisfy the
collateral order doctrine.
Although this confusion stems from the early
1980s when this issue was first litigated, determining
whether the denial of appointment of counsel is
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immediately appealable has continued to plague the
courts. See, e.g., Perkinson v. White, 569 F. App’x 152
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that denial of appointment of
counsel orders under § 1915 are not appealable as a
collateral order); Christian v. Commerce Bank, N.A.,
No. 4:14CV00201 AGF, 2014 WL 2218726 (E.D. Mo.
May 29, 2014) (holding that same orders under § 1915
are immediately appealable as collateral orders).
Without a determinative indication by this Court, the
circuits will continue to diverge in their application of
the collateral order doctrine, providing a disservice to
indigent plaintiffs in the process.
Apart from the confusion between the circuits,
this issue has created division within the circuits
themselves, causing judges to invert on position and
craft minute distinctions between statutes.
In the Second Circuit, the court first held in Miller
that a plaintiff could immediately appeal the denial of
appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 296
F.2d at 283 (affirming district court’s decision).
However, a mere nine years later, a different panel reversed position in the same case. See Miller, 425 F.2d
at 1206. The court held that a plaintiff could not
immediately appeal such orders because it not only
required the court to get involved in the merits of the
case, but also contributed to the increased burden on
the appellate court system in the last decade. Id.
The Ninth Circuit provides just one example of
line drawing between statutes when determining
whether the denial of appointed counsel is immediately appealable. In Bradshaw, the court allowed the
immediate appeal of a denial of appointment of
counsel order when brought as part of a Title VII suit.
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662 F.2d at 1320 (allowing appeal under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1)(B)). But the court refused to extend the
holding to habeas proceedings in Weygandt, 718 F.2d
at 954 (distinguishing habeas proceedings from Title
VII suits because of separability concerns). The Fifth
and Eighth Circuits have similar distinctions.
Compare Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (5th Cir. 1977)
(allowing appeal in Title VII cases), with Marler, 997
F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend Caston
to product liability suits); compare Slaughter, 731
F.2d at 588 (allowing immediate appeal for Title VII),
with Pena-Calleja, 720 F.3d at 989 (declining to
extend Slaughter to § 1983 claims). Even if line
drawing is appropriate, this Court should provide
guidance on which statutes should allow immediate
appeal and which statutes fall outside the collateral
appeal doctrine so that the circuits are unified in
application.
This Court has previously recognized the
confusion among and within circuits in previous
petitions for certiorari during the 1980s that were all
subsequently denied. Justice White, joined by Justice
Blackmun, explained that the continued confusion
demonstrated by the Second and Ninth Circuits
“warrant[ed the Court’s] granting certiorari” in his
dissent in Welch, 484 U.S. 903 (1987).
The circuit split in the 1980s has only become
more entrenched as every circuit has now decided
whether the collateral appeal doctrine allows for
immediate appeal of the denial of appointment of
counsel orders. Without further guidance from this
Court on a “plainly recurring question,” the district
and circuit courts will continue to hold differently on
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whether immediate appeal is appropriate. See Henry
474 U.S. 1036 (1985) (White and Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Allowing courts to interpret the collateral
appeal doctrine differently results in immediate relief
for some indigent litigants and likely devastation for
others.
B. Allowing immediate appeal of denial of
appointment of counsel orders will provide
greater access to the courts and promote
judicial economy.
Granting certiorari over this conflict will finally
determine whether indigent litigants have the ability
to immediately appeal the denial of appointed counsel
orders, thus providing greater access to the courts. If
indigent plaintiffs have to wait until a final order has
been determined, many will be forced to drop legitimate claims, and others will struggle through the
legal process but fail to preserve issues for appeal. By
denying jurisdiction over the denial of appointment of
counsel orders, courts are not only inhibiting access to
counsel to those who need it most, but are also
creating incoherent records to be sorted through later
on appeal.
For the appointment of counsel to have any
“practical effect,” counsel must be appointed at the
start of the case. See Ray, 640 F.2d at 477. Counsel
benefits the judicial process by effectively developing
the record and introducing legal arguments to
preserve for appeal on a level that a layperson—but
especially an indigent plaintiff—would simply not be
able to match. Pro se litigants do not generally have
the skills or resources to develop the record in a way
to help preserve appealable issues.
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If indigent plaintiffs are forced to wait until a final
decision to appeal the denial of appointment of
counsel, the record below will undoubtedly come to the
appellate judge in disarray. If a pro se litigant does
successfully bring his case to the appellate court, the
judge will have to spend time parsing through an
incoherent record to determine any merit to the claim
and the necessity of counsel. See Bradshaw, 662 F.2d
at 1315 (stating that a pro se appeal provides a
“guarantee that the resources of the court and the
parties would be senselessly dissipated in the
process”). Without the assistance of counsel from the
beginning, the plaintiff “would be bound by the
inevitable prejudicial errors she would make at her
first trial.” Id. at 1311-12.
Even if an appellate judge grants a new trial with
appointed counsel, the case essentially has to begin
again, causing a greater strain on judicial time and
resources than an immediate collateral appeal.
Judicial economy will be better served if the appellate
court can determine whether a plaintiff requires
counsel to navigate complex legal matters as a
collateral issue at the outset of the trial. It does not
serve the judiciary’s best interests to allow an
indigent plaintiff to develop a record in a case
involving complex legal issues, likely committing
prejudicial errors in the process that are difficult or
impossible to cure on appeal. By waiting for a final
decision, “the effectiveness of appellate review will be
seriously impaired by the very nature of the order”
because of the state of the record.” Bradshaw, 662
F.2d at 1315.
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Laypersons do not have the same access to
resources or the knowledge to adequately represent
themselves in court when dealing with complicated
legal issues. See Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (stating
that a layperson “has little hope of successfully
prosecuting his case to a final resolution on the
merits”). Justice and efficiency are better served by
providing counsel immediately to indigent plaintiffs
faced with such complex legal matters.
The purpose behind the in forma pauperis statute,
moreover, was to provide effective counsel to plaintiffs
when they could not otherwise afford it. Denying an
appeal of such counsel until a final decision on the
merits cuts contrary to this principle. Many litigants
are forced to abandon their cases before trial
commences if not provided counsel to assist in
navigating a complex legal field. Others may try to
continue through trial but fail to preserve issues for
appeal. Both of these outcomes make reviewing the
denial of appointment of counsel orders only after a
final decision insufficient to address the needs of
indigent plaintiffs.
The appointment of counsel is generally outcome
determinative for indigent plaintiffs. And thus, the
denial of appointment of counsel is the single, most
important judicial order of the entire litigation. But
since the order predates any record development and
any legal theories, it falls completely outside the
merits of the case and should be recognized as
collaterally appealable.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be
granted, the judgment below should be reversed, and
the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 16-5004

September Term, 2015
1:14-cv-00403-RDM
Filed On: June 6, 2016

SAI,

Appellant,

v.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, (TSA),
Appellee.
Before: Kavanaugh and Wilkins, Circuit Judges;
Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the order to show cause
filed January 19, 2016, and the appellant’s petition for
an initial hearing en banc, which the court denied by
order filed March 11, 2016; and the lack of any further
response to the order to show cause, it is
ORDERED that the order to show cause be
discharged. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal be
dismissed. This court lacks jurisdiction to review on
an interlocutory basis the district court’s denial of
appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel. See
Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-83 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
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Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this
disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein
until seven days after resolution of any timely
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed.
R. App. P. 41(b);
D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
By: /s/
Robert J. Cavello
Deputy Clerk
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 16-5004

September Term, 2015
1:14-cv-00403-RDM
Filed On: March 11, 2016

SAI,

Appellant,

v.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, (TSA),
Appellee.
Before: Garland, Chief Judge; Henderson, Rogers,
Tatel, Brown, Griffith, Kavanaugh, Srinivasan,
Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellant’s petition for
initial hearing en banc, and the absence of a request
by any member of the court for a vote, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
By: /s/
Ken R. Meadows
Deputy Clerk
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 14-403 (RDM)
SAI,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that
the parties shall file a joint status report on or before
March 4, 2016. It is further ORDERED that the
parties shall appear for a status conference on March
11, 2016, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 21. Any party who
wishes to appear telephonically shall contact the
Courtroom Deputy Clerk to arrange for telephonic
participation. During the status conference held
today, January 7, 2016, Plaintiff Sai made an oral
motion to reconsider the Court's March 13, 2014 fiat
order denying without prejudice his Motion for Leave
to Proceed in forma pauperis and for Appointment of
Counsel. The oral motion was based on the reasons
stated in Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in
forma pauperis and to Appoint Counsel in Case No.
14-1876 (Dkts. 65 & 66). The Court orally denied the
motion for the same reasons as stated in that case. See
No. 14-1876, Dkt. 88. Signed by Judge Randolph D.
Moss on 1/7/2016. (lcrdm1, ) (Entered: 01/07/2016)
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APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 14-1876 (RDM)
SAI,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, who suffers from a neurological disorder
that causes intermittent muteness and muscle
spasms, alleges that he was harassed and mistreated
on the basis of his disability during two incidents at
airport security checkpoints in early 2013—one at
Boston Logan International Airport (“BOS”) and the
other at San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”).
He filed administrative complaints with the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) under
procedures
promulgated
pursuant
to
the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. When DHS
failed to respond to his complaints, he brought this
suit, alleging causes of action under the
Rehabilitation Act and the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Notably, the
present suit does not directly seek redress for
Plaintiff’s alleged mistreatment at the security
checkpoints. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that DHS, the
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), and
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the individuals who were responsible for processing
his administrative complaints violated his rights by
failing to respond to his those complaints within the
time period prescribed by the governing regulation.
To the extent the Rehabilitation Act provides a
remedy relating to any discrimination that Plaintiff
may have suffered at the two checkpoints, he has
elected to pursue those claims in other litigation. See,
e.g., Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,
2015).
The case is before the Court on three dispositive
motions: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by DHS, the TSA
and several individual defendants sued in their
official capacities, Dkt. 23; (2) a separate motion to
dismiss filed by the individual defendants, who were
also sued in their personal capacities, Dkt. 63; and (3)
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt.
7. Plaintiff has also filed three non-dispositive
motions: (4) a motion for leave to take discovery, Dkt.
72 at 38; (5) a motion for leave to amend his complaint,
Dkt. 73; and (6) a renewed motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, Dkts. 65, 66. This Memorandum
Opinion and the Order that accompanies it resolve
these six motions before the Court.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against DHS, the
TSA, and the individual defendants sued in their
official capacities (“Agency Defendants”), the Court
will grant in part and deny in part the Agency
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and will grant in part
and deny in part Plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment. First, to the extent Plaintiff
seeks to compel the Agency Defendants to respond to
his BOS complaint, his claim is moot, because DHS
responded to the BOS complaint after he filed this
action. Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages
as a result of the Agency Defendants’ failure to
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process his complaints, neither the Rehabilitation Act
nor the APA affords him such a remedy. Finally, to
the extent that Plaintiff seeks to compel the Agency
Defendants to respond to his SFO complaint on the
theory that they have unlawfully delayed such a
response, the Court agrees that such relief is
available. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
underlying cause of action against these defendants
arises under the APA, not the Rehabilitation Act,
there is no evidence that Congress intended to
preclude relief under Section 706(1) of the APA, which
instructs courts to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
Further, because it is uncontroverted that the Agency
Defendants have failed to respond to Plaintiff’s SFO
complaint for almost three years, and because
Defendants have failed to justify the delay, the Court
agrees with Plaintiff that relief under Section 706(1)
is not only available but appropriate. Accordingly, the
Agency Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED
with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary and
nonmonetary relief arising out of the BOS complaint
and for monetary relief arising out of the SFO
complaint and DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s
claim for nonmonetary relief arising out of his SFO
complaint. Correspondingly, Plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment is GRANTED with respect
to his claim for nonmonetary relief arising out of his
SFO complaint and DENIED with respect to his BOS
complaint.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against the
individual defendants sued in their personal
capacities (“Individual Defendants”), the Court
concludes that the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679,
requires the substitution of the United States for
Individual Defendants for every claim except the
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claim asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and that, because
Plaintiff concededly failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing suit, these
claims must then be dismissed. The Court also
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
under Bivens or any similar cause of action against
the individual-capacity defendants. Accordingly,
Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against them are
dismissed.
Finally, for the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for additional discovery
(Dkt. 72 at 38), DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
amend his complaint (Dkt. 73), and DENIES
Plaintiff’s renewed motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis or, in the alternative, to file an
application ex parte and under seal (Dkt. 65).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Plaintiff, whose full legal name is Sai, has a
“permanent, episodic motor disability” that can cause
painful muscle spasms, speech impairment, and even
paralysis. Dkt. 1 at 47. Episodes of high stress can
trigger or exacerbate these symptoms. Id. As a result,
Plaintiff has on multiple occasions experienced acute
symptoms while going through airport security
checkpoints. This action arises out of two such
incidents: one at Boston Logan International Airport
on January 21, 2013, and another at San Francisco
International Airport on March 1, 2013. Id. at 37.
During each incident, Plaintiff alleges that TSA
agents failed to accommodate his disability by
denying him access to medication and writing
implements for use when he was unable to speak,
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among other things. See id.; see also Dkt. 31-1 at 1–3.
In response to these incidents, Plaintiff filed two
administrative complaints with DHS— the first on
January 26, 2013, and the second on March 15, 2013.
Dkt. 1 at 30–31. In the complaints, he alleged that
the agency had violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794, by discriminating against him on the
basis of his disability. Id. DHS acknowledged that it
had received Plaintiff’s complaints, id., but did not
respond to the substance of the complaints within the
180-day period specified in the DHS regulations.
Plaintiff made repeated efforts to obtain a response to
his complaints, see id. at 33–43, but to no avail. As of
November 5, 2014, when he filed this lawsuit, Plaintiff
had received no substantive response from DHS to
either complaint. Id. at 1, 43. Although Plaintiff
eventually received a response to his BOS complaint
(on March 4, 2015, over two years after it was filed),
see Dkt. 31 at 1, he has received no response to his
SFO complaint.
Attempting to remedy what he views as unlawful
delay, Plaintiff filed this suit against a variety of
defendants—including DHS, the TSA, and ten named
individual
defendants
ranging
from
the
Administrator of the TSA to the individual DHS
officers who handled his complaints, in both their
official and their personal capacities. Dkt. 1 at 5–6.
Construing the pro se complaint liberally, as the
Court is required to do, Plaintiff alleged causes of
action under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794;
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706; Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388; the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346; and a number of
common-law torts, including negligent infliction of
emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional
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distress, and conspiracy.1 Id. at 9–14. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order
compelling DHS to produce responses to his
administrative complaints, and money damages, as
well as costs. Id. at 14–15.
The present action does not seek relief for the
allegedly discriminatory acts at the security
checkpoints. Instead, Plaintiff maintains that “[t]his
suit is brought strictly for matters relating to
defendants’ handling of [his] complaints.” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff has brought another suit, in the District of
Massachusetts, to challenge the TSA’s actions at the
BOS checkpoint. See Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D.
Mass. Sept. 4, 2015).2 The present action, in contrast,
is premised on a regulation that requires DHS to
respond to an administrative complaint brought
under the Rehabilitation Act within 180 days. See 6
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). Defendants do not dispute that
1 Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff’s complaint properly

pleads a claim under the APA. See Dkt. 23 at 12–13; Dkt. 62 at
3–4. But Count 1 of Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly states that “5
[U.S.C.] § 706(1) requires that defendants be compelled [to] issue
the two responses unlawfully withheld and unreasonably
delayed.” Dkt. 1 at 10 (emphasis in original). Especially
considered in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the complaint’s
pleadings are sufficient to state an APA claim.
2 The Massachusetts action also repeats many of the allegations

raised here relating to the handling of Plaintiff’s administrative
complaints. See Complaint at 7, Sai, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass.
Sept. 4, 2015) (describing the TSA’s “deliberate[] and unlawful[]
refus[al] to respond to Sai’s grievance”). In addition, Plaintiff has
filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act in this district seeking the disclosure of material relating to
the incidents and to the handling of the administrative
complaints. See Sai v. TSA, No. 14-cv-703 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2014).
The merits of that action are not before the Court in this Opinion
or in the accompanying Order

11a
DHS failed to act on Plaintiff’s complaints within the
180-day period. They dispute only the legal
consequences of their inaction.
B. Procedural History
The Court has previously outlined the extensive
procedural history of this case and will only repeat the
portions of that history relevant to the pending
motions. See Sai v. DHS, 99 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C.
2015). In particular, Plaintiff moved for partial
summary judgment almost immediately after filing
the action. See Dkt. 7. Amid a flurry of more than a
dozen procedural motions filed by Plaintiff,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.
See Dkt. 23. On April 16, 2015, the Court entered an
order resolving the pending procedural motions,
setting a schedule for the resolution of the dispositive
cross-motions, and imposing rules governing
subsequent motions practice. Sai, 99 F. Supp. 3d at
56–69. Both Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment and Defendants’ motions to dismiss are now
fully briefed.
In the meantime, on March 4, 2015, DHS
responded to Plaintiff’s first administrative
complaint, which concerned his treatment at Boston
Logan International Airport. See Dkt. 31. In its
response, the TSA denied that any violation of the
Rehabilitation Act had occurred. See id. at 8. In the
TSA’s view, the actions that TSA agents took at the
airport were based not on Plaintiff’s disability but on
his “continued failure to cooperate with the screening
process.” Id. Further, the TSA reasoned, nothing the
TSA agents did at the airport deprived Plaintiff of
“full and complete access to TSA’s security screening
program.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ruskai v. Pistole, 775 F.3d
61, 79 (1st Cir. 2014)). Finally, the TSA explained,

12a
Plaintiff’s failure fully to inform TSA agents about his
disability limited “the government’s ability to offer a
reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff
appealed the TSA’s decision within the agency, but his
appeal was denied on August 25, 2015. See Dkt. 78-1
at 1. He filed suit to challenge that decision in the
District of Massachusetts on September 4, 2015. See
Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2015).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Threshold Issues
1. Mootness
As an initial matter, the Court must consider how
DHS’s denial of Plaintiff’s complaint arising out of the
BOS incident affects the scope of the case and the
Court’s jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals has
observed, “subject matter jurisdiction ‘is, of necessity,
the first issue for an Article III court,’ for ‘[t]he federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they lack
the power to presume the existence of jurisdiction in
order to dispose of any case on any other grounds.’”
Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 170 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (quoting Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668
F.2d 547, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). This principle,
moreover, extends to each distinct claim asserted in a
case—absent subject-matter jurisdiction, federal
courts are without power to consider or to adjudicate
any claim, see Loughlin, 393 F.3d at 171—and the
principle cannot be lessened or avoided by combining
multiple claims in a single count.
A federal court’s duty to ensure that it is acting
within the confines of its jurisdiction continues
throughout the course of the litigation. The parties
must maintain a live dispute, with concrete
consequences, “at all stages of review, not merely at
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the time the complaint is filed.” Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). Thus, where “events
have so transpired that the decision will neither
presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a morethan-speculative chance of affecting them in the
future,” the relevant case or claim becomes moot,
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 897 F.2d 570, 575
(D.C. Cir. 1990), and, absent unusual circumstances,
the Court is deprived of jurisdiction. See also
Loughlin, 393 F.3d at 170 (“[M]ootness doctrine
encompasses the circumstances that destroy the
justiciability of a suit previously suitable for
determination.’” (quoting 13A Charles A. Wright et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533 (2d ed.
1984))).
Here, there is no dispute that the Court had Article
III jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims at the time he
filed them. But it is equally clear that “events have
transpired” that have limited the scope of the live
controversy between the parties. As relevant here,
Plaintiff filed the instant suit to compel DHS and
other defendants to respond to the two administrative
complaints that Plaintiff filed. Since then, DHS has
rendered its final decision with respect to the BOS
complaint. As a result, at least with respect to that
aspect of the dispute, there is nothing left for the
Court to do, and that portion of the case is therefore
moot.
Despite having received a response to his BOS
complaint, Plaintiff contends that the Court still has
jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim for
injunctive and declaratory relief because the alleged
misconduct is “capable of repetition, yet evading
review.” See Dkt. 80 at 7. Plaintiff is correct that the
courts recognize an exception to the mootness doctrine
for claims that “evad[e] review” because “the
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challenged action was in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,” and
that are “capable of repetition” because there is “a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party would be subject to the same action again.”
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (quoting
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per
curiam)); see also United Bhd. of Carpenters &

Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. Operative Plasterers’ &
Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, AFLCIO, 721 F.3d 678, 687–88 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Plaintiff

is incorrect, however, that the exception applies here.
Whether defendants acted unlawfully in failing timely
to respond to Plaintiff’s BOS complaint is not an issue
that “evades review”: indeed, Plaintiff has raised the
same legal issue with respect to his SFO complaint,
which the Court’s Opinion resolves. And because DHS
has yet to act on that administrative complaint,
making it ripe for adjudication here, Plaintiff has no
basis to invoke the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception to the mootness doctrine with
respect to the BOS complaint.
Plaintiff also contends that he has not received the
type of response to the BOS complaint to which he is
entitled. Pointing to his motion to expedite, Plaintiff
argues that what he has sought are responses to the
administrative complaints “without litigationinduced omissions.” Dkt. 70 at 21 (quoting Dkt. 7 at
3). That, however, is a different claim from the one
asserted in the complaint, and at any rate it is facially
untenable. It is one thing to seek to compel an agency
to respond to an administrative complaint within a
reasonable time. It is entirely another to seek to
control what that response says. Under Section 706(1)
of the APA, a court may at times compel an agency “to
take a discrete agency action that is it is required to
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take,” but may not direct “how it shall act.” Norton v.
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)

(emphases in original). Because Plaintiff did not seek
this relief in the complaint—and because any effort to
amend the complaint to include such a claim would be
futile—this argument cannot salvage Plaintiff’s claim
for injunctive and declaratory relief stemming from
the BOS events.
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief relating to the BOS complaint are, accordingly,
DISMISSED as moot. To the extent Plaintiff seeks
damages or other relief with respect to the handling
of the BOS complaint, those issues are separately
addressed below.
2. Summary Judgment and Rule 56(d)

Plaintiff argues, as a preliminary matter, that the
defendants’ motions to dismiss should be treated as
motions for summary judgment and that the Court
should then defer or deny the motions in order to
permit Plaintiff an opportunity to obtain discovery
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
Dkt. 72 at 7, 38; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56(d). The
Court disagrees. Rule 12(d) requires a court to treat a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment if it relies on “matters outside the
pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But Plaintiff points
to only two documents that he believes satisfy this
standard. He first notes that DHS relies on its
response to his BOS administrative complaint to
argue that the case is moot. But that document was
the subject of Plaintiff’s own motion to take judicial
notice, see Dkt. 31, which the Court now GRANTS,
and, in any event, neither the fact that DHS has now
responded nor the substance of that response is in any
way disputed. Cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

16a

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (describing
“documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference” and “matters of which a court may take
judicial notice” as “sources courts ordinarily examine
when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions”). The
undisputed existence of a DHS response to the BOS
complaint does not turn the mootness inquiry into one
in which additional evidence is necessary, nor does
Plaintiff identify any evidence he believes he might
obtain in discovery that would be relevant to the
inquiry.

The only other “factual” material Plaintiff
identifies is Defendants’ Westfall certification, see
Dkt. 23-1, but the Westfall Act contemplates the
introduction of such a certification at the motion-todismiss stage, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), and the Court
knows of no authority for the proposition that its
introduction converts a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, as
discussed below, to the extent that Plaintiff
challenges the government’s Westfall certification,
Plaintiff has not identified any disputed question of
fact with sufficient specificity to open the door even to
“limited discovery” regarding the absolute immunity
afforded government employees acting within the
scope of their employment. See Wuterich v. Murtha,
562 F.3d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s
conclusory assertion that he “cannot present facts
essential to justify [his] opposition” because they are
“unavailable” to him, Dkt. 72 at 38 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d)), does not satisfy this standard. As the
Court of Appeals has cautioned, opening the door to
discovery based on “intuition” or the hope of finding
some basis to challenge a Westfall certification
“simply has no place in a Westfall Act absolute
immunity case.” Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 386.
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The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiff’s request
to convert Defendants’ motions to dismiss into
motions for summary judgment, Dkt. 72 at 7, and
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for discovery under Rule
56(d), id. at 38–39.
B. Count I
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the
Agency Defendants violated Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the APA by failing to respond
to Plaintiff’s administrative complaints in a timely
manner. As a preliminary matter, the Court observes
that Plaintiff cannot plausibly claim relief under
Count I other than nonmonetary relief relating to the
Agency Defendants’ delay in processing the SFO
complaint. The Rehabilitation Act does not waive the
sovereign immunity of the United States for monetary
claims arising from alleged discrimination “under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency,” see Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 191, 197
(1996), nor does the APA waive sovereign immunity
for claims seeking monetary relief, see 5 U.S.C. § 702
(authorizing “[a]n action in a court of the United
States seeking relief other than money damages”).
And, for the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief relating to
his BOS administrative complaint are moot.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive or
declaratory relief requiring DHS to provide a response
to his SFO complaint, however, he is on stronger
ground. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Count
I based on two straightforward propositions: (1) DHS’s
Rehabilitation Act regulations require the agency to
respond to an administrative complaint within 180
days, 6 C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1); and (2) almost three years
have passed since Plaintiff filed the SFO complaint
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with DHS. Defendants do not dispute either premise,
but they maintain that neither the Rehabilitation Act
nor the APA provides an applicable cause of action. In
their view, the Rehabilitation Act “implies a private
right of action to sue for injunctive relief in federal
court” for violations of the substantive rights
protected by Section 504, but the Act does not create
a private right of action for violations of the
administrative rules at issue here. Dkt. 60 at 4–5.
They further argue that the APA does not fill this gap,
since catch-all review is available under the APA only
“for final agency action [including a ‘failure to act’] for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704. According to Defendants,
the availability of a cause of action under the
Rehabilitation Act for violations of the substantive
rights established by Section 504 constitutes an
alternative “adequate remedy in a court” and thus
precludes APA review of any shortcomings in the
administrative process. Dkt. 23 at 10–12.
As explained below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff
does not have a cause of action under the
Rehabilitation Act for the agency’s failure to respond
to the SFO complaint in a timely manner. Defendants
are also correct that, at times, the existence of an
alternative remedy for a substantive right precludes
APA review of an agency’s asserted failure to resolve
an administrative complaint in a timely fashion.
Thus, for example, in Council of and for the Blind of
Delaware County Valley v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521,
1531–32 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), the Court of
Appeals held that the availability of an alternative
substantive remedy set out in an independent statute
precluded APA review of the agency’s failure to meet
a statutory deadline for administrative resolution of a
discrimination claim. The Court disagrees, however,
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that this is such a case.
Defendants’ preclusion argument turns on the
premise that Plaintiff has a cause of action under the
Rehabilitation Act, and that this cause of action is an
adequate alternative remedy that precludes APA
review. As explained below, however, that premise is
incorrect. Any claim that Plaintiff may have to enforce
Section 504 does not arise implicitly under the
Rehabilitation Act; it arises under the APA itself. As
a result, unlike in Council of and for the Blind, there
is no basis to conclude that Congress has provided
Plaintiff with an independent statutory remedy that
would preclude APA review of Plaintiff’s related
administrative claim. Because DHS has manifestly
failed to comply with its obligation to render a decision
on the SFO complaint in a timely manner, and has
offered no justification for its delay, the Court agrees
that Plaintiff is entitled to relief for “agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(1).
1. Source of Plaintiff’s Cause of Action
Because Defendants’ arguments turn on the
remedies afforded Plaintiff by the Rehabilitation Act
and the APA, the Court begins by identifying the
source of Plaintiff’s cause of action to enforce the
Rehabilitation
Act.
Congress
enacted
the
Rehabilitation Act, the “first major federal statute
designed to protect the rights of and provide
assistance to the handicapped people of this country,”
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990),
“to ensure that members of the disabled community
could live independently and fully participate in
society,” American Council of the Blind v. Paulson,
525 F.3d 1256, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under Section
504 of the Act,
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[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504 further provides that
“[t]he head of each [Executive] agency shall
promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out” the 1978 amendments to the Act, which
extended its protections to “program[s] or activit[ies]”
conducted by federal agencies. Id.
Section 504 unambiguously imposes a duty on
federal agencies not to discriminate on the basis of
disability in “any program or activity” they conduct. It
is this duty that Plaintiff initially sought to enforce—
first by filing an administrative complaint with the
agency, and then by filing suit in Massachusetts to
challenge the agency’s response to that complaint. But
Section 504 also requires federal agencies to adopt
implementing regulations to “carry out” their
obligations under the Act. Count I of the complaint in
this lawsuit implicates this duty; it asserts that the
Agency Defendants have violated the Rehabilitation
Act by failing to comply with the regulations they
have promulgated to enforce it. The Agency
Defendants, as noted above, do not contest that they
have failed to comply with the governing regulations.
They simply argue that Plaintiff lacks a cause of
action to enforce those regulations, because (1) the
Rehabilitation Act does not permit a suit to challenge
an agency’s delay in responding to an administrative
complaint brought under procedures promulgated
pursuant to the Act, and (2) Plaintiff cannot resort to
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Section 706(1) of the APA, because the existence of a
substantive Rehabilitation Act cause of action
precludes APA review, including review of an alleged
administrative failing.
a. Rehabilitation Act
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff
does not have a cause of action under the
Rehabilitation Act to remedy DHS’s failure to respond
to the SFO complaint in a timely manner. The
Rehabilitation Act says nothing about the processing
or consideration of administrative complaints.
Rather, it merely requires that federal agencies
“promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out” the 1978 amendments to the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a). There is no question that DHS has adopted
those regulations, see 6 C.F.R. § 15.70, and Plaintiff
does not seek to compel the adoption or modification
of the statutorily-required regulation. Likewise, the
remedial provision of the Rehabilitation Act says
nothing about claims to enforce the Act’s
implementing regulations. As discussed in greater
detail below, in relevant respects, that section of the
Act
merely
authorizes
claims
relating
to
discrimination by recipients or providers of federal
assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a).
Nor is there any basis to imply a cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act for an agency’s failure to
comply with its implementing regulations. As the
Supreme Court has admonished, “private rights of
action to enforce federal law must be created by
Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001). As a result, “[t]he judicial task is to interpret
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether
it displays an intent to create not just a private right
but also a private remedy.” Id. Section 504 requires
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agencies to adopt procedures to implement Congress’s
antidiscrimination mandate, but it lacks the “‘rightscreating’ language” that the Supreme Court
demanded in Sandoval. See id. at 288; see also
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13
(1979). To the contrary, the part of Section 504 that
requires agencies to adopt these regulations operates
much like the statutory text found insufficient in
Sandoval: its focus is not “on the individuals
protected” but on the federal agencies that it instructs
to implement the substantive provisions of the Act.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289. The fact that those
implementing regulations require that DHS respond
to complaints within 180 days, moreover, does not
create a cause of action where Congress has failed to
do so. As Sandoval also explains, “[l]anguage in a
regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may
not create a right that Congress has not.” Id. at 291.
b. Administrative Procedure Act
As a result, the question comes down to whether
the APA creates a cause of action for Defendants’
alleged failure to respond to the SFO complaint in a
timely manner. Defendants argue that the APA is
unavailable to remedy any shortcomings in DHS’s
administrative process because the Rehabilitation Act
provides an adequate alternative remedy in the form
of an implied cause of action to vindicate substantive
rights under Section 504. That contention, in turn,
requires that the Court consider the statutory basis
for whatever cause of action Plaintiff may have to
assert those substantive rights.
Although the law is unsettled regarding the exact
source of the cause of action, no court has questioned
that claims for nonmonetary relief seeking to enforce
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Section 504’s ban on discrimination in federal
programs are actionable. In Lane v. Peña, the
Supreme Court held that Congress, in amending the
Rehabilitation Act to cover federal programs and
activities, did not intend to waive the United States’s
sovereign immunity for suits for money damages. See
518 U.S. at 189, 200. The United States did not
contest the availability of injunctive relief, however,
id. at 196, and the Supreme Court was careful to limit
its discussion and holding to “awards of monetary
damages,” id. at 189, 192–93, 196, 200. Subsequently,
in American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, an
advocacy group and several blind individuals sued the
Department of Transportation for failing to design
and issue forms of paper currency that would be
recognizable to the blind. See Am. Council of the Blind
v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 52 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d,
525 F.3d 1256. Before the district court, the United
States argued that Lane foreclosed the availability of
nonmonetary relief against federal agencies that had
violated Section 504. See 463 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58.
The district court rejected that argument, concluding
that Lane had done no more than foreclose a suit for
damages against a federal agency, id. at 58, and the
government abandoned the argument on appeal, see
525 F.3d at 1266. Although the Court of Appeals did
not discuss the source of the relevant cause of action,
it affirmed the district court’s interlocutory decision
granting a declaratory judgment against the Treasury
Department for failing “to design and issue paper
currency that is readily distinguishable to the visually
impaired,” id. at 1259, and remanded the case to the
district court “to address the Council’s request for
injunctive relief,” id. at 1274.
This, however, leaves the question whether the
cause of action for a substantive claim of disability
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discrimination in a federal program or activity arises
under the Rehabilitation Act itself or under the APA.
This question was not addressed in Lane, because, as
the Solicitor General noted in his brief, “resolution of
the source of the cause of action, be it under Section
504(a) directly or the APA, would . . . not alter the
outcome of this case” as long as Section 504(a) was not
read to waive sovereign immunity for monetary
damages. See Brief for the Respondents, Lane, 518
U.S. 187 (No. 95-365), 1996 WL 115795, at *27 n.17.
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that
the cause of action arises under the APA. First, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts not to
imply causes of action in the absence of evidence that
Congress intended “to create not just a private right
but also a private remedy.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
Here, Congress unambiguously intended to create a
right to be free from disability discrimination in
federal programs and activities. See 29 U.S.C. §
794(a). But there is relatively little evidence that
Congress intended to create a private cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act to enforce that right. As
the Supreme Court observed in Lane, the Act
expressly specifies the remedies available to “any
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any
recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of
such assistance,” id. § 794a(a)(2), but it says nothing
about the remedies available to a person aggrieved by
discrimination in a “program or activity conducted by
an[] Executive agency,” id. § 794(a); see Lane, 518 U.S.
at 192.
Second, it is easy to imagine why Congress would
not have created a private cause of action to enforce
Section 504 against federal agencies: it knew that
review would be available under the APA. The APA
“embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to
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one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’”
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). As then-Judge Breyer wrote
almost three decades ago, “federal action is nearly
always reviewable for conformity with statutory
obligations without any such ‘private right of action.’”
NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149,
152 (1st Cir. 1987). Although Congress might provide
for a cause of action against an agency (as well as a
waiver of sovereign immunity) when it intends to
permit an aggrieved person to recover damages from
the United States, when it intends to permit only
declaratory and injunctive relief, there will often be no
need to provide for a cause of action that is
independent of the APA. Cf. J.L. v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
971 F.2d 260, 268 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Whether this suit
is characterized as review of agency action under the
APA or a private suit directly under the
Rehabilitation Act should not make a significant
difference to [plaintiffs’] chances for success on the
merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted))),
overruled on other grounds by Lane, 518 U.S. 187.
Finally, although the caselaw on this question
from other circuits is sparse, it supports the
conclusion that Plaintiff’s cause of action arises under
the APA. The most thorough treatment of the issue
can be found in the First Circuit’s decision in Cousins
v. Secretary of the Department of Transportation, 880
F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc). In that case, the
plaintiff, a hearing-impaired truck driver, claimed
that a Department of Transportation regulation
prevented him from working in violation of his rights
under the Rehabilitation Act. Although a panel of the
court initially held that the plaintiff properly brought
his action as an implied claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, the en banc court disagreed and
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held that the claim should have been brought under
the APA. Id. at 605–08. The First Circuit explained
that, although the Rehabilitation Act expressly
provides a cause of action against the government in
its role as provider of federal funds, “the Act is silent
about whether and how a person injured by the
government as regulator is to enforce the Act against
the government.” Id. at 605 (emphasis in original). In
that court’s view, this “omission simply reflects the
fact that such a person already has a right to judicial
review, as set forth in the APA.” Id. This conclusion,
the court explained, furthers the purposes of the APA
to provide a “single uniform method for review of
agency action,” id., and it avoids the oddity of implying
a cause of action where another statute already
provides a means for the plaintiff “to challenge [the]
agency action,” id. at 606.
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion,
relying largely on Cousins, in Clark v. Skinner, where
a truck driver whose left arm was amputated above
the elbow challenged a different Department of
Transportation
regulation,
which
required
commercial drivers to demonstrate proficiency with
the use of both upper limbs. 937 F.2d 123, 125–26 (4th
Cir. 1991). Like the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
held that such an action may be maintained, if at all,
under the APA, and that “the Rehabilitation Act does
not afford [plaintiff] a private cause of action against
the Secretary of Transportation.” Id. at 126. As the
Fourth Circuit explained, the “proper avenue of
appeal” for such an aggrieved party “is from a final
administrative decision” pursuant to the APA.3 Id.
3 District courts in other circuits have reached conflicting
results. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Seattle Hous. Auth., No. 09-226,
2010 WL 1633323, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2010) (agreeing
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One might argue that the First and Fourth
Circuits’ decisions are distinguishable on the ground
that they concerned actions undertaken by “the
government as regulator,” Cousins, 880 F.2d at 605,
as opposed to alleged discriminatory misconduct by
government employees. Cf. Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the
United States, 941 F.2d 780, 793 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
APA’s purpose is to provide an administrative forum
for those challenging administrative and regulatory
agency action, not to provide a forum for adjudicating
government tort liability.”), overruled on other
grounds by Lane, 518 U.S. 187. The Court is not
persuaded, however, that this distinction holds.
Whether a suit to enforce Section 504 is treated as
arising under the Rehabilitation Act or the APA, Lane
makes clear that the remedies available are the same:
the plaintiff may only obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief, not money damages. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 197;
5 U.S.C. § 702. Any person whose discrimination
claim can be alleviated by forward-looking relief of
that nature, moreover, may well have the kind of
claim that is suited to APA review. At least as a
general matter, those acts of discrimination that can
be remedied by forward-looking relief (for instance, by
a change in the agency’s policies or practices) are
likely to involve either demands for relief that have
been formally rejected or established rules or
procedures that fail to comply with the Act. See 5
U.S.C. § 551(4)–(11), (13). There is nothing discordant
about applying the APA to claims of that type.
with the First and Fourth Circuits that plaintiffs must proceed
under the APA), with Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. 054696, 2008 WL 1858928, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008) (finding
“jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation Act”), with Cooke v.
Bureau of Prisons, 926 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731–32 (E.D.N.C. 2013)
(declining to reach the issue).
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The question whether any particular alleged
violation of Section 504—including the violation
alleged in Plaintiff’s SFO complaint—will be subject
to review under the APA is not one the Court needs to
address today. It is sufficient for present purposes to
conclude that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide
an implied cause of action for discrimination in federal
programs and activities (or for failure to comply with
administrative procedures), but that the APA
provides a cause of action to challenge final agency
action that is not in accordance with the
Rehabilitation Act. In this action, Plaintiff merely
challenges the failure of Defendants to respond to his
administrative complaint in a timely manner. If
Plaintiff subsequently brings an action under the APA
relating to allegedly discriminatory conduct during
the SFO incident and/or the substance of the agency’s
response, a court can at that time determine whether
he has identified a final agency action subject to
review under the APA, whether the alleged final
agency action is contrary to the Rehabilitation Act,
and whether any other defense is available.
2. The Agency Defendants’ Preclusion Defense
Having concluded that any cause of action that
Plaintiff may have for an alleged violation of Section
504’s prohibition against discrimination in federal
programs or activities arises under the APA, the
Court must next consider the Agency Defendants’
contention that Section 704 of the APA, which
precludes review of any agency action for which there
is another “adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. §
704, bars review of Defendants’ delay in responding to
Plaintiff’s SFO complaint. In support of this
argument, Defendants rely on a line of decisions
holding that statutes similar to the Rehabilitation Act
preclude APA review. See Dkt. 72 at 22–23. Those
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decisions, however, are inapposite. In each case, the
Court of Appeals held that an independent statutory
scheme with a unique remedial structure precluded
separate resort to the APA. Here, because Plaintiff’s
cause of action arises under the APA itself, there is no
independent statutory scheme that implicitly or
expressly precludes APA review.
In the first of these cases, Council of and for the
Blind of Delaware County Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709
F.2d 1521, the Court of Appeals considered whether
plaintiffs could sue the Treasury Department’s Office
of Revenue Sharing (“ORS”) for failing to comply with
a statutory timetable for resolving claims of
discrimination by recipients of federal funding and for
failing to enforce the relevant restrictions on
discrimination by those recipients. Congress had
provided a private right of action that permitted
private citizens to file an administrative complaint
with the ORS and then to sue the grant recipient if
the ORS either (a) failed to issue a determination
within 90 days or (b) determined that the grant
recipient had complied with the antidiscrimination
provision. See id. at 1527. Against that backdrop, the
Court of Appeals declined to imply a cause of action
against the ORS under the relevant statute, and
instead held that Congress intended to permit private
enforcement only by way of actions against those
recipients allegedly engaged in discriminatory
conduct. Id. at 1531. Of more relevance here, the
Court then held that the statute also precluded relief
under Section 704 of the APA, because the private
remedy in the statute—that is, the provision
permitting plaintiffs to sue the recipients of federal
funds—was sufficient to remedy the recipients’
discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1531–32. In so holding,
the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ contention
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that the private right of action was inadequate
because it did not provide a means of redressing the
ORS’s own failure to enforce “the statute’s
nondiscrimination commend.” Id. at 1532. As the
Court explained, “even if . . . a nationwide suit would
be more effective than several [suits against funding
recipients], we hold that the remedy provided by
Congress is adequate to redress the discrimination
allegedly encountered by appellants.” Id at 1533
(emphases in original).
The second case followed a similar path. There, a
group of civil-rights organizations filed suit to
challenge what they saw as the federal government’s
failure to enforce a number of civil-rights statutes,
including Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act. See
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos (“WEAL”),
906 F.2d 742, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (R.B. Ginsburg,
J.).4 They, too, alleged that the recipients of federal
funds had acted in a discriminatory manner and that
the agencies had failed to respond to administrative
complaints about the underlying discrimination. The
Court held, relying on Council of and for the Blind,
that neither Title VI nor the other statutes afforded
the plaintiffs a right of action against the government
in its role as a monitor of the recipients’ compliance.
Id. at 749–50. The Court also addressed, and rejected,
the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the APA
4 The plaintiffs in WEAL sued school districts across the country

as “recipient[s] of Federal assistance,” and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in its role as the “Federal
provider of such assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Accordingly,
although WEAL’s holding applies to the Rehabilitation Act, it
applies only to the remedial scheme governing violations of the
Act by the recipients of federal funding and by agencies in their
roles as the providers of such funding. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192–
93 (making this distinction).
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permitted them to sue the government even if Title VI
(and the other statutes) did not. Id. at 750–51. It
held—again following Council of and for the Blind—
that Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act precluded
reliance on the APA, even though the statute did not
provide a mechanism by which the plaintiffs could
obtain review of the government’s failure to respond
to their complaints and commence investigations in a
timely manner. See id. As the Court of Appeals
explained,
Suits directly against the discriminating
entities may be more arduous, and less effective
in providing systemic relief, than continuing
judicial oversight of federal government
enforcement. But under our precedent,
situation-specific
litigation
affords
an
adequate, even if imperfect, remedy. So far as
we can tell, the suit targeting specific
discriminatory acts of fund recipients is the
only court remedy Congress has authorized for
private parties, situated as plaintiffs currently
are.

Id. at 751.
Neither Council of and for the Blind nor WEAL
considered whether the availability of a suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief against a federal
agency precludes reliance on the APA to challenge
that agency’s failure to respond to an administrative
complaint. Cf. El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood
Health Ctr., Inc. v. HHS, 396 F.3d 1265, 1270–71
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing these cases as holding
that “APA review is unavailable where there is a
private cause of action against a third party otherwise
subject to agency regulation”). That unresolved issue,
however, was addressed and resolved in Garcia v.

32a

Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009). There, in

response to allegations that the Department of
Agriculture had for years ignored complaints
regarding its own discriminatory conduct, Congress
passed a statute permitting eligible complainants
either to file suit in federal court or to renew their
administrative complaints. See 563 F.3d at 521–22.
Those who chose to renew their administrative
complaints “could seek de novo review in federal
court” after the agency had adjudicated those
complaints. Id. at 522. The plaintiffs in Garcia “chose
the first option,” but also brought APA claims against
the agency arising out of its failure to investigate their
prior complaints. Id.
The Court of Appeals held, following WEAL, that
the federal statute precluded review of the agency’s
failure to investigate under the APA by affording the
plaintiffs a cause of action to challenge the
discrimination itself. Id. at 523. The fact that the
plaintiffs “fault [the agency’s] regulation of itself and
not its regulation of a third party,” the Court of
Appeals explained, did not render WEAL inapplicable
to the remedial scheme. Id. at 525. “If anything,” it
explained, “a[] . . . discrimination claim filed directly
against the [agency] affords a better remedy than
those available” against the third parties in prior
suits. Id. “If successful, a plaintiff can obtain
declaratory and injunctive relief against the agency
itself,” which “would presumably deter the agency to
the same extent as a successful APA claim.” Id. The
Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiffs’ efforts to
identify an independent purpose for their APA suit,
explaining that “[t]he suggestion that [substantive]
relief would not vindicate appellants’ interest
insuring that the [agency] adheres to its duty-toinvestigate regulations”—that is, the plaintiffs’
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administrative aim—“was rejected in Council [of and
for the Blind]. . . and WEAL.” Id.
The government argues that Garcia, Council of
and for the Blind, and WEAL control this case. It

contends that the availability of nonmonetary relief
under the Rehabilitation Act to remedy a substantive
violation of Section 504 precludes the use of the APA
to remedy an administrative violation. But, as the
Court has explained, the government’s argument
proceeds from a mistaken premise: that Plaintiff’s
cause of action arises under the Rehabilitation Act,
not the APA itself. The distinction is critical. The
government cites no authority for the proposition that
the APA can preclude itself—that is, that the
availability of a substantive remedy under the APA
may
in
some
circumstances
preclude
an
administrative remedy under the APA. Such an
argument is at odds with a commonsense reading of
the preclusion provision, which asks whether there is
some “other” alternative remedy available in court.
See 5 U.S.C. § 704. It also runs counter to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. 879 (1988).

In Bowen, the Supreme Court traced the history of
the preclusion rule found in Section 704 of the APA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Court explained that the
primary purpose of this statutory provision was to
make clear “that Congress did not intend the general
grant of review in the APA to duplicate existing
procedures for review of agency action,” such as those
that permitted review of Federal Trade Commission
and National Labor Relations Board orders in the
courts of appeals. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 903 (emphasis
added). That same statutory purpose is identified in
the authoritative Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 95 (1947), which
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explained: “The net effect, clearly intended by the
Congress, is to provide for a dovetailing of the general
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act with
the particular statutory provisions which the
Congress has moulded for special situations.” The
preclusion provision, moreover, should “not be
construed to defeat the central purpose of providing a
broad spectrum of judicial review of agency action,” at
least not in a case in which Congress has not
established “special statutory procedures” to channel
review of an agency’s decisionmaking. Bowen, 487
U.S. at 903. That is what has happened here: while
Congress has specified exactly what remedies a
plaintiff has to vindicate his or her rights under the
Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal
funding, or even an agency providing such funding, it
has said nothing about what remedies a plaintiff has
against an agency that discriminates on the basis of
disability in a federal program or activity. See Lane,
518 U.S. at 192–93. In such a circumstance, Bowen
directs that Section 704’s preclusion provision is
inapplicable.
Moreover, to the extent that Garcia, Council of and
for the Blind, and WEAL turned on the fact that the

statutory schemes considered in those cases did not
require plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative
remedies—and therefore the plaintiffs did not require
an agency decision before proceeding to court—there
is at least a question whether such a rationale would
extend here. Although there is no exhaustion
requirement in the APA, see Darby v. Cisneros, 590
U.S. 137, 146–47 (1993), a plaintiff is entitled to
review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). The Court need
not, and does not, decide what would constitute “final
agency action” in the context of an alleged violation of

35a
Section 504 or, indeed, precisely what agency “rule,
order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent
thereof, or failure to act,” see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13),
Plaintiff might seek to challenge under the APA. Cf.
J.L., 971 F.2d at 265 (“If a court’s intervention is
required in the form of an APA suit, a Rehabilitation
Act suit or both, its decision should be informed by a
considerable body of information about the
administration of the SSI program and SSA’s internal
organization and operations.”). For present purposes,
the Court merely concludes that the final agency
action requirement under the APA implicates many of
the same purposes as an exhaustion requirement and,
as a result, Defendants’ delay in responding to
Plaintiff’s complaint could well pose a barrier to any
substantive claim that Plaintiff might ultimately seek
to pursue—particularly to the extent that any such
claim might rely on an asserted failure of DHS to
redress a grievance expressed in that complaint.
The Court therefore concludes that the Agency
Defendants’ preclusion defense fails, and DENIES
their motion to dismiss to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of
their failure to timely process his SFO administrative
complaint.
3. 180-Day Requirement
With respect to Count I of the complaint, the only
remaining question is whether the Court should
“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed” under Section 706 of the APA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “[A] claim under § 706(1) can
proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency
failed to take a discrete agency action that it is
required to take.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in
original). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have
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failed to respond to his SFO complaint in the 180-day
timeframe set out in the governing regulations. See 6
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). The Agency Defendants do not
deny that they have failed to respond to the complaint.
Nor do they dispute that the response Plaintiff seeks
is a “discrete agency action” that they are “required to
take.” Indeed, the Agency Defendants mount no
defense of their failure to respond to Plaintiff’s SFO
complaint whatsoever, except to assert that Plaintiff
has no cause of action by which to hold them
accountable. Because the Court disagrees with that
premise, it will proceed to the merits of Plaintiff’s
motion for partial summary judgment.
First, the Agency Defendants’ failure to act is the
kind of discrete and mandatory action that the
Supreme Court described in Norton. See 542 U.S. at
64. There, the Supreme Court illustrated the
governing law with an example analogous to the
present case, explaining that a statutory provision
that required an agency “‘to establish regulations to
implement’ interconnection requirements ‘[w]ithin 6
months’ of the date of the enactment of the [statute]
would . . . support[] a judicial decree under the APA
requiring the prompt issuance of regulations.” Id. at
64–65 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1)). The fact that
the deadline Plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case is
set out in a regulation, not a statute, is immaterial;
the Norton Court explained that an agency could be
compelled to follow “agency regulations that have the
force of law.” Id. at 65. Defendants’ failure to respond
to Plaintiff’s complaint is, therefore, the appropriate
subject of a suit under Section 706(1).
The question, then, is whether the Agency
Defendants’ delay is “unreasonable” under the APA.
Although “[t]here is no per se rule as to how long is too
long to wait for agency action,” In re American Rivers
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& Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court of
Appeals has, in a series of cases beginning with

Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.
FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
outlined six factors to guide courts in determining
whether relief under Section 706(1) is warranted.
“The first and most important factor is that ‘the time
agencies take to make decisions must be governed by
a rule of reason.’” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d
849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting TRAC, 740 F.2d at
80). The remaining five factors are:
(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or
other indication of the speed with which it
expects the agency to proceed in the enabling
statute, that statutory scheme may supply
content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that
might be reasonable in the sphere of economic
regulation are less tolerable when human
health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court
should consider the effect of expediting delayed
action on agency activities of a higher or
competing priority; (5) the court should also
take into account the nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court
need not find any impropriety lurking behind
agency lassitude in order to hold that agency
action is “unreasonably delayed.”

Id. (quoting In re United Mine Works of Am. Int’l Union,
190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ delay (now
verging on three years) is “prima facie unreasonable”
in light of the 180-day deadline. Dkt. 7 at 1. But the
question is not that simple. As one commentator has
observed, the cases that address agencies’ failure to

38a
comply with statutory deadlines “fall along the
spectrum of judicial responses,” with some requiring
strict compliance and others permitting dramatic
deviation. 2 Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law
Treatise § 12.3 (5th ed. 2010). The Court of Appeals
has both denied claims of undue delay under Section
706(1) when agencies have missed the mark by much
more time than Defendants have here, see Grand
Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 476 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (no remedy under Section 706(1) where
Congress required agency to promulgate regulations
within 120 days and regulations were not issued for
ten years), and granted relief under Section 706(1) in
cases of delay roughly analogous to the case before the
Court, see MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d
322, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining that the
Telecommunications Act “assumes that rates will be
finally
decided
within
a
reasonable
time
encompassing months, occasionally a year or two, but
not several years or a decade”). The key question,
under the APA and TRAC, is whether the delay is
“reasonable” in light of the evidence in the record.
The problem before the Court is that there is no
evidence in the record regarding the reasons behind
the Agency Defendants’ failure to respond to
Plaintiff’s SFO complaint. In both their initial
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment, Dkt. 24, and in a supplemental opposition
that the Court permitted them to file, Dkt. 60, the
Agency Defendants do no more than reiterate their
arguments as to why Plaintiff lacks a cause of action
to compel them to respond to his complaint. As a
result, the record is devoid of evidence or arguments
that would justify Defendants’ failure to respond to
Plaintiff’s complaint.
Although the question is not as simple as Plaintiff
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represents, the Court ultimately agrees that
Defendants’ 2.75-year delay in responding to his SFO
complaint is “unreasonable” under TRAC. As a basic
matter, and as the Agency Defendants concede, they
have failed for almost three years to process an
administrative complaint that, by regulation, they
were required to have processed in 180 days. See 6
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). It is difficult to envision the “rule
of reason” that would permit an agency routinely to
delay the processing of administrative complaints by
a factor of five times the timetable set out in the
agency’s governing regulations—and Defendants
have offered no justification or explanation here.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s interest in the timely processing
of the complaint is not insubstantial. See TRAC, 750
F.2d at 80. He alleges in his complaint that he has
suffered mistreatment “at multiple airports over
multiple years, including in the nearly two years since
the SFO incident happened.” Dkt. 1 at 48 n.2
(emphasis in original). To the extent that Plaintiff has
a right to be free of discrimination in the airport and
has asked the agency to remedy such discrimination,
the agency’s delay in responding to his complaint has
the effect of perpetuating the alleged wrong.
Moreover, it is plain even from the record before
the Court that many of the factors that ordinarily
militate against Section 706(1) relief are not present
here. First, the relief Plaintiff seeks does not—as
many cases do—seem to present the kind of “complex
scientific, technological, and policy questions” that
may arise when the relief sought is the promulgation
of a regulation or a policy. See Action on Smoking &
Health v. Dep’t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 993 (D.C. Cir.
1996); see also Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council,
Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(observing that the Section 706(1) determination “will
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depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the
task at hand”); In re United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d
at 555 (“It is difficult for us to second-guess this
projection in light of the host of complex scientific and
technical issues involved . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). All Plaintiff seeks is a response to a
complaint—a response that might be eight pages (the
length of DHS’s response to his BOS complaint) or
less. Second, while TRAC instructs reviewing courts
to “consider the effect of expediting delayed action on
agency activities of a higher or competing priority,”
750 F.2d at 80, there is no basis to conclude that
DHS’s
delay
in
responding
to
Plaintiff’s
administrative complaint is the product of “higher or
competing priorit[ies].” After all, DHS responded to
Plaintiff’s BOS complaint in March 2015—over nine
months ago—but has still not responded to Plaintiff’s
SFO complaint, which was filed only two months
later. This is thus not a case in which a plaintiff is
seeking to upend a “first-in, first-out” procedure by
attempting to “automatically go to the head of the line
at the agency.” See Open Am. v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 614–15 (D.C. Cir.
1976). Thus, on the current record, “the agency [has]
not show[n] due diligence in processing plaintiff’s
individual request.” Id. at 615.
The Court is sympathetic to the difficulties that
agencies encounter when they are tasked with
meeting the kinds of timetables that the regulation on
which Plaintiff relies impose. And it has no desire to
micromanage DHS’s efforts to process administrative
complaints, here or in the future. But this is an
unusual case: Plaintiff has demonstrated that the
agency has exceeded the deadline it has set for itself
five times over, and the agency has provided no reason
why it should be excused from complying with the
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deadline. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
motion for partial summary judgment in part (with
respect to the SFO complaint) and DENIES it in part
(with respect to the BOS complaint). In an
accompanying Order, the Court will direct the Agency
Defendants to produce a response to the SFO
complaint within a reasonable time, and no later than
January 22, 2016.
B. The Remaining Counts
The Court next considers the motions to dismiss
filed by both the Agency Defendants (Dkt. 23) and the
individual defendants in their personal capacities
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) (Dkt. 63).
In these motions, Defendants assert a number of
defenses to the array of tort claims that Plaintiff has
pled arising out of their failure to timely process his
administrative complaint. In particular, Defendants
argue that (1) the Westfall Act requires that the
United States be substituted for the Individual
Defendants as to the majority of Plaintiff’s claims; (2)
the FTCA requires the dismissal of all of the tort
claims against the United States, as Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust them; and (3) the remaining claims
against Individual Defendants sound neither in
Bivens nor in any other cause of action. The Court
agrees.
As a threshold matter, Count IV of Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges that defense counsel has
“multipl[ied]
proceedings
unreasonably
and
vexatiously” in this case and requests sanctions under
28 U.S.C. § 1927. Dkt. 1 at 12. But Plaintiff provides
no relevant support for his claim of unreasonable
conduct “in any case” brought “in any court of the
United States,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court
sees no basis whatsoever for the imposition of
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sanctions. See Patton Boggs, LLP v. Chevron Corp.,
825 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he bar for
the imposition of fees and costs under § 1927 is
extremely high.”). The Court therefore construes
Count IV as a motion for sanctions and DENIES it.
The remaining counts in Plaintiff’s complaint
allege an array of tort claims against ten named and
additional unnamed defendants, ranging from John
Pistole, the former administrator of the TSA, to the
DHS officials who handled his administrative
complaints. See Dkt. 1 at 5–6. Count II alleges that all
of the Individual Defendants are liable under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, for
violating Plaintiff’s “civil rights”—seemingly his
rights under the Rehabilitation Act and DHS
regulations. Count III appears to allege claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress against all of the Individual Defendants.
Count V alleges that several Individual Defendants—
Zachary Bromer, Jeremy Buzzell, Erika Lucas, and
several unnamed defendants—“obstructed the
investigation of [Plaintiff’s] Rehabilitation Act
complaints.” Dkt. 1 at 13. Count VI alleges standalone
claims of civil conspiracy against all of the Individual
Defendants who were involved in handling Plaintiff’s
administrative complaints.
Plaintiff thus brings two kinds of claims against
the Individual Defendants: tort claims premised upon
violations of state law (Counts III, V, and VI), and tort
claims premised on violations of statutory or
constitutional law (Count II). The problem for
Plaintiff, as Defendants observe, is that the FTCA
provides the exclusive remedy for the first set of
claims, and Plaintiff has no remedy for the second.
Accordingly, the Court will also grant Defendants’
motions to dismiss Counts II, III, V, and VI.
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1. Westfall Act Substitution
Defendants first move to substitute the United
States for the Individual Defendants under the
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the
Westfall Act. See Dkt. 78 at 9. The Westfall Act
“accords federal employees absolute immunity from
common-law tort claims arising out of acts they
undertake in the course of their official duties.”
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007); see
Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380. In pertinent part, the Act
provides:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that
the defendant employee was acting within the
scope of his office or employment at the time of
the incident out of which the claim arose, any
civil action or proceeding commenced upon such
claim in a United States district court shall be
deemed an action against the United States
under the provisions of this title and all
references thereto, and the United States shall
be substituted as the party defendant.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The effect of a certification
under the Act, in short, is to “convert[] [a] tort suit into
a[n] FTCA action,” subject to all of the exceptions and
procedural requirements that accompany that
statute. Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380.
Here, the Attorney General’s delegate has attested
that the Individual Defendants “were acting in their
scope of their employment at the time of the
allegations stated in the Complaint.” Dkt. 23-1.
Although a plaintiff may contest a scope-ofemployment certification, see Gutierrez de Martinez
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995), Plaintiff has not
done so. Instead, he argues only that the Westfall Act
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permits substitution only to the extent the Individual
Defendants were sued in their official (rather than
their personal) capacities. Dkt. 74 at 36. But, as the
Court has previously noted, “an official-capacity suit
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a
suit against the [agency]” rather than the named
defendant. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985). Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual
Defendants in their personal capacities, by contrast,
are labeled as such because they would (if successful)
impose personal liability on them. The substitution
mechanism in the Westfall Act seeks to shield
government employees from such a prospect, at least
when they act within the scope of their employment.
See Osborn, 549 U.S. at 229. Here, Plaintiff has
provided no evidence that the Individual Defendants
were not acting within the scope of their employment
at the time they processed his complaints, and he
cannot evade the Westfall Act in any other way.
Plaintiff also appears to argue, Dkt. 74 at 36–37,
that Count II of his Complaint, which purports to
bring a Bivens claim, falls within the Westfall Act’s
exceptions for claims “brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States” or “a statute of the
United States under which such action against an
individual is otherwise authorized.” 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(2); see also Osborn, 549 U.S. at 159. The
Court agrees. Congress intended to preserve Bivens
suits as a procedural mechanism for plaintiffs alleging
constitutional torts by federal officers, and did not
intend to replace all preexisting statutory remedies
with the FTCA. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S.
160, 166–67 (1991) (“[T]he FTCA is not the exclusive
remedy for torts committed by Government employees
in the scope of their employment when an injured
plaintiff brings . . . a Bivens action . . . or . . . an action
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under a federal statute that authorizes recovery
against a Government employee.”); Simpkins v.
District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371–72 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not fall
within this exception because he cannot maintain a
damages action for their failure to process his
administrative complaint, Dkt. 78 at 10–11, but this
argument goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, not
the propriety of Westfall Act substitution.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
motion to substitute the United States for the
Individual Defendants with respect to Counts III, V,
and VI, and DENIES it with respect to Count II. The
Court will discuss these counts further below.
2. FTCA Claims (Counts III, V, and VI)
Defendants argue that the Court, having
substituted the United States for the Individual
Defendants and “convert[ed] [Plaintiff’s] tort suit into
a[n] FTCA action,” Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380, must
now dismiss Plaintiff’s tort claims against the United
States. They argue that all three tort counts should be
dismissed without prejudice on the basis of Plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Dkt.
62 at 10. They also suggest that, for various reasons,
the Court could dismiss each count with prejudice. See
Dkt. 62 at 10 n.6 (arguing that, to the extent that
Count III sounds in “abuse of process,” the FTCA
explicitly does not waive the United States’s sovereign
immunity against such a claim); Dkt. 63 at 16–18
(arguing that Counts V and VI do not make out
plausible claims). The Court agrees with Defendants
that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed on the
basis of his failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and therefore declines to reach Defendants’
additional arguments.
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The FTCA precludes a claim for damages arising
out of “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government . . . unless the claimant
shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
Plaintiff did not file an FTCA claim with DHS before
filing suit. See Dkt. 26. At an earlier stage in the
proceedings, Plaintiff moved the Court to stay
proceedings on his FTCA claims while he exhausted
his remedies. Id. As the Court explained in its earlier
opinion, there is considerable authority for the
proposition that “[t]he plain language of the FTCA . .
. unambiguously ‘bars a plaintiff from filing suit
before he or she has exhausted . . . administrative
remedies,’” a failure that “cannot be remedied by . . .
attempting to exhaust while the suit is pending.” Sai,
99 F. Supp. 3d at 62–63 (quoting Edwards v. District
of Columbia, 616 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2009)).
The Court has no need to resolve the question,
however, as Plaintiff now concedes that his FTCA
claims should be dismissed. See Dkt. 72 at 35. The
Court of Appeals has made clear that, under such a
circumstance, a dismissal should be without
prejudice, so that an FTCA plaintiff can exhaust his
administrative remedies and then proceed. See
Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 371 (“[F]orcing these cases
through the administrative process helps sort out not
only worthless claims, but also worthy ones, which
may be settled at that stage.”). The Court will,
accordingly, dismiss Counts III, V, and VI without
prejudice.
3. Statutory / Bivens Claims (Count II)
Defendants finally argue that Count II of
Plaintiff’s complaint, which purports to bring a claim
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
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U.S. 388, against the Individual Defendants, should
be dismissed with prejudice because there is no
Bivens remedy available to Plaintiff. The Court notes,
as a threshold matter, that Count II is styled as a
claim against Defendants arising out of their violation
of Plaintiff’s statutory rights—that is, his rights
under “the Rehabilitation Act, and DHS’
implementing regulations.” Dkt. 1 at 11. But no
matter how Count II is styled, the Court agrees with
Defendants that it must be dismissed for failure to
allege a cause of action.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens
“recognized an implied private cause of action for
damages against federal officials who violate the
Fourth Amendment.” Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369,
372 (D.C. Cir. 2014).5 But in the decades since Bivens,
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
“proceeded cautiously in implying additional federal
causes of action for money damages.” Meshal v.
Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Individual Defendants argue vigorously that the
Court should decline to infer a Bivens remedy arising
out of agency delay, see Dkt. 63 at 18–19, 21–25, and
the Court agrees that there is no basis for a Bivens
claim here. It is established that a Bivens remedy
exists, if at all, to “remedy . . . constitutional
violations.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals
has made clear that there is no violation of the Due
Process Clause arising out of an agency’s failure to
5 A private party cannot bring a Bivens action against a federal

agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Thus to the
extent Count II could be construed to plead a Bivens claim
against the Agency Defendants, it is dismissed with prejudice on
that ground.
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process discrimination complaints in a timely
manner. See Council of and for the Blind, 709 F.2d at
1533. Because Plaintiff can point to no constitutional
violation that allegedly occurred during DHS’s
processing of his administrative complaints, he
cannot invoke Bivens against any of the officers who
processed them. Nor, to the extent Plaintiff’s
complaint can be construed as stating claims against
any of the Individual Defendants arising under a
statute, could such a claim be viable. Bivens does not
extend to statutory violations. See Wilson, 535 F.3d at
704. And to the extent that Plaintiff seeks money
damages from the federal officers who processed his
complaint, he is without a remedy, as neither the APA
nor the Rehabilitation Act establishes a damages
remedy against federal officers. As Plaintiff concedes,
moreover, to the extent that his complaint can be read
as stating claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
statutory violations, such claims also would not be
viable, as § 1983 only extends to state and local
officers. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418, 424 (1973); see also Dkt. 72 at 36. In sum,
Plaintiff has stated no viable statutory claim for
damages against the Individual Defendants.
Having concluded that (1) Plaintiff’s tort claims
against the Individual Defendants must proceed, if at
all, against the United States under the FTCA and
after Plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies,
and (2) Plaintiff cannot pursue Bivens claims against
the Individual Defendants arising out of the agency’s
delay in processing his administrative complaints, the
Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
C. Plaintiff’s Motions
The Court now turns to the two remaining motions
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filed by Plaintiff: his motion for leave to file an
amended complaint, Dkt. 73, and his renewed motion
to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 66. (The Court has
previously discussed, and denied, Plaintiff’s pending
motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 7, and his
pending motion for discovery under Rule 56(d), Dkt.
72 at 38.) For the following reasons, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s motions.
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint
Plaintiff has moved for leave to file an amended
complaint. See Dkt. 73. To the extent Plaintiff seeks
to add claims relating to events that occurred after the
filing of his original complaint—such as DHS’s failure
to respond to Plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of his
administrative complaint—the Court notes that his
motion is better construed as a motion to file a
supplemental pleading under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). But “the
distinction is in most instances of little moment,”
United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir.
2002), and has no bearing on this case, because both
motions for leave to amend and motions to
supplement should be denied where amendment (or
supplementation) would be futile. Wildearth
Guardians v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23
(D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint purports to “drop[] [his] FTCA claims”
(although it retains all tort claims against Individual
Defendants); to “add[] a claim” under the
Rehabilitation Act and the APA for Defendants’
alleged failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s appeal
of DHS’s denial of his administrative complaints; and
to “clarif[y] [his] APA claims” by making clear that
Count I is pled under the APA as well as the
Rehabilitation Act (and under § 706(2) as well as §
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706(1)). See Dkt. 73 at 1; Dkt. 73-1 at 8–13.
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion on various
grounds. They argue that it is unnecessary for
Plaintiff to amend his complaint to drop his FTCA
claims, because he has already consented to their
dismissal, and that it would be futile to add any claim
arising out of DHS’s processing of Plaintiff’s appeal of
his administrative complaint, whether under the APA
or the Rehabilitation Act, because neither statute
permits Plaintiff to challenge agency delay. See Dkt.
78 at 17–20.
The Court agrees that it would be unnecessary or
futile to permit Plaintiff to amend or supplement his
complaint. Although “the court should freely give
leave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2), it is well established that leave to amend
should be denied when amendment would be futile.
See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s principal reason for
seeking leave to amend his complaint is to add a claim
arising out of DHS’s alleged failure to timely process
his appeal of the denial of his BOS complaint. But
DHS has now processed his appeal, see Dkt. 78-1, and
so the claim Plaintiff seeks to add is moot for the same
reasons that his original claims relating to his BOS
complaint are moot. Nor is there any need for Plaintiff
to amend his complaint to “drop” his FTCA claims or
to “clarify” his APA claims, given the Court’s
conclusions that his FTCA claims must be dismissed
and that his APA claims were pled with sufficient
clarity in the original complaint.
The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint on the ground that the
proposed amendments would be futile or unnecessary.

51a
3. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis
At the commencement of the litigation, Plaintiff
sought in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. Dkt. 3. At
that time, he swore “under penalty of perjury” that he
could not afford a lawyer and that he was a
“beneficiary of a state-based system for low income
persons,” but he refused, “as a matter of principle and
to preserve [his] standing in a forthcoming Supreme
Court certiorari petition,” to submit an affidavit
containing “any details of [his] personal finances,
state benefits, or similarly private matters on the
public record merely because [he was seeking] IFP
status.” Id. at 1. Finally, Plaintiff stated that he was
willing to file the required affidavit under seal and ex
parte. Id. Recognizing, however, that the Court of
Appeals had recently rejected a similar application by
Plaintiff in a different case, Sai v. U.S. Postal Service,
No. 14-1005 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 7, 2014), and that, as
a result, any appeal would be unlikely to prevail,
Plaintiff also submitted a check for the required filing
fee “in case this Court” were to deny Plaintiff’s
application for lack of sufficient support. Id. at 2. The
Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion “without prejudice
for failure to meet the statutory requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1915.” Jan. 30, 2015 Minute Order.
Following this Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion,
the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for a
writ of certiorari, which sought review of the Court of
Appeals’s decision to deny his IFP application under
similar, although not identical, circumstances. Sai v.
U.S. Postal Service, 135 S. Ct. 1915 (2015). At that
point, Plaintiff once again filed a motion with this
Court, renewing his prior IFP application or, in the
alternative, seeking reconsideration of the Court’s
prior ruling. Dkt. 65. At the same time, Plaintiff
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requested that the Court certify the issue for
interlocutory appeal. Id. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s
motion on the grounds that Plaintiff’s application fails
to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires that
a person seeking IFP status submit an affidavit
setting forth the person’s assets and demonstrating
an inability to pay the filing fee; Plaintiff previously
litigated and lost this issue in the Court of Appeals;
Plaintiff has failed to specify any specific reasons
justifying his request to file under seal and ex parte;
and, in any event, the interest in public access
outweighs any interest in nondisclosure. Dkt. 67.
Defendants also oppose interlocutory review. Id.
Plaintiff’s brief is over ten pages long, and it
touches on issues including whether IFP affidavits are
“ministerial” or “judicial” documents, whether the
First Amendment right of access applies, and whether
Defendants have standing to oppose the motion. But
neither Plaintiff’s brief nor the accompanying
affidavit provides any explanation of why or how
disclosure of the required information would cause
Plaintiff any unique or identifiable harm. Rather,
Plaintiff’s position is apparently premised on a matter
of principle—he simply he asserts that his right to
access to the courts “will be chilled” if he is required
to disclose the required information and that he
“absolutely refuse[s] to waive [his] privacy rights or
[to] subject [himself] to the risks from public
disclosure of [his] affidavit.” Dkt. 65 at 17 (emphasis
in original). He further states that he also “absolutely
refuse[s] to provide such information to the
defendants in this case,” unless subject “to a subpoena
with opportunity for a motion to quash.” Dkt. 65-1 ¶
12.
Against this backdrop, the Court need not decide
whether an IFP affidavit is a “judicial record” or how
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the rights of public access derived from the First
Amendment and the common law would apply to it.
See, e.g., In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174 (1st
Cir. 2003); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158,
163 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Section 1915 requires the
submission of a detailed affidavit, and, under the
Court’s practice these submissions, like other filings,
are a matter of public record. It is incumbent upon
Plaintiff to demonstrate why this usual rule should
not apply in his case, and the unsupported assertion
of an unqualified interest in privacy is not sufficient.
Cf. Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 951
F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The decision as to
access to judicial records is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be
exercised in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case.” (quoting United
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 316–17 (D.C. Cir.
1980)). As Plaintiff points out, the issue he raises
“affects tens of thousands of similarly situated
litigants.” Dkt. 65 at 17. If every one of those litigants
was entitled to file an IFP application under seal and
ex parte, with no showing of particularized need, the
public would be denied important transparency in the
working of the judiciary, opposing parties would be
deprived of the opportunity to raise objections, and
the courts would lose a corresponding check on
potential misstatements or omissions in IFP
affidavits. Plaintiff’s insistence that he is “absolutely”
unwilling to share the required information with
opposing counsel, moreover, is particularly difficult to
justify. Parties often exchange extraordinarily
sensitive information in litigation subject to protective
orders. Yet, here, Plaintiff refuses to disclose his
finances to Defendants without any explanation of
how he might be harmed or reason to believe that
Defendants’ counsel would not maintain the
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confidentiality of that information.
Although Plaintiff fails to identify any basis for
distinguishing his case from the many thousands of
other cases in which a party seeks IFP status, he
alludes to a number of generally applicable risks. He
notes, for example, that disclosure of financial
affidavits might pose a risk of identity theft. That, of
course, does not explain why Plaintiff insists on ex
parte treatment. But, even more fundamentally, it
does not explain the basis for Plaintiff’s concern.
Plaintiff is not required to provide account numbers,
his Social Security number, or any similar
information. It seems implausible, moreover, that
identity thieves are likely to peruse IFP applications
in search of their victims. Nor does Plaintiff’s general
assertion that the affidavits might “disclose
embarrassing and potentially harmful information,
such as an affiant’s family situation, disabilities, [or]
dependents,” id. at 17, further his argument. If
Plaintiff has particular reasons why particular
information should not be disclosed on the public
docket, he is free to raise that issue with the Court.
What he cannot do, however, is seek the benefit of IFP
status while refusing to comply with the relevant
rules and procedures and declining to offer any
individualized rationale short of his personal
conviction that the information at issue should not be
disclosed.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis, or, in the alternative, for
leave to file an affidavit in support of his application
ex parte. Because this Opinion and the accompanying
Order disposes of all claims in this case, Plaintiff has
no need for an order certifying the question under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court therefore DENIES his
request for certification as moot.

55a
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ motions to dismiss in part and DENIES
them in part, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment in part and DENIES it in
part. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s remaining
motions. A separate Order will accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: December 15, 2015

